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DICK V. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO.
CHARLES V. LAUGHLIN*
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dick v. New
York Life Insurance Co.1 is one more shot -in what has been called
the "Battle of Presumptions,"2 but it is a shot from a court with con-
siderable standing. The decision might be misconstrued, and in any
event it is troublesome to this writer. Prior to the decision in Dick the
bar was justified in believing that the United States Supreme Court
followed the Thayer theory of presumptions.3 In Dick that theory was
rejected. However, the Court did not purport to make a federal rule
as to presumptions but only purported to be following the law of
North Dakota.
The accuracy of the Court's statement in Dick that "under the
Erie rule, presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are
'substantive'. . ." may be conceded. 4 It follows that in a diversity case
the federal court will apply the same rule as to presumptions that is
followed in the courts of the state in which it sits. Still the decision in
Dick impresses the writer as unfortunate for the following reasons.
(I) It is contrary to the Thayer theory.5 (2) The Court improperly
construed the law of North Dakota. (3) The reasoning by which the
Court reached its conclusion is confused. For those who prefer the
Thayer theory the sting may appear to have been removed from the
decision by virtue of the fact that the Court did not purport to reject
that theory but only followed North Dakota law, which it construed
as rejecting the Thayer theory. In any event the bar should be cau-
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
1359 U.S. 437 (1959).
2Wykoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944).
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 5o3 U.S. 161 (1938).
'Cf. Sampson v. Channell, nlo F.2d 754 (st Cir. i94o), cert. denied, Sio U.S. 650.
'For the reasons why the writer prefers the Thayer theory see the following
articles: Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L.
Rev. 195 (1953); and Laughlin, The Location of the Burden of Persuasion, x81 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 3 (1956).
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tioned against giving Dick a broader construction than is justified.
But the reasoning used by the court is still a matter of concern.
A true presumption operates in favor of a party with the burden of
persuasion upon any issue and entitles him to have that issue conclu-
sively determined in his favor in the absence of evidence rebutting
the presumption. To this extent there is no difference between the
various views. For example: consider the presumption involved in
Dick, which is one of the most common. A policy has been issued in-
suring a specified person against death by accidental means. The in-
sured person suffers a violent death and an action is brought by the
person named as beneficiary in the policy. If the death resulted from
an act of suicide it was not accidental and there can be no recovery.
The plaintiff-beneficiary has the burden of persuasion (commonly
called the burden of proof) upon the issue of suicide because the fact
of accident goes to the very essence of the coverage of -the policy.8
If, however, the plaintiff introduces evidence of a violent death both
a permissible inference and a presumption arise. There is a will to live
which makes suicide the exception, not the rule. Therefore the jury
is entitled to infer an accidental death from proof of the fact of violent
death; this is a permissible inference. Also, the jury is required to find
accident unless there is evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion of
suicide; this is a presumption. The usually accepted difference be-
tween an inference and a presumption is that an inference is permis-
sive whereas a presumption is compulsive. By proving a violent death
the plaintiff is entitled to have a directed verdict upon the issue of
accident unless the defendant insurance company introduces evidence
sufficient to justify a finding of suicide. Thus far, there is no material
dispute between the various theories about presumptions.
What happens when rebutting evidence is introduced? It is said
that there are at least eight different theories. Actually, however, the
eight theories reflect only two points of view. One point of view is
that the presumption disappears (i.e., loses its compulsive effect al-
though not necessarily its permissive effect) with the introduction of
rebutting evidence. This is the Thayer theory. The other point of
view is that the presumption retains its conclusive effect until the
trier of fact (usuially the jury) credits the rebutting evidence. The
technique of handling a case under the Thayer theory is easy. The
This must not be confused with the location of the burden of persuasion
upon an issue of suicide in suits upon ordinary life insurance policies, as distin-
guished from policies insuring against accidental death. In such cases suicide, within
a limited time, is a matter of defense and the burden of persuasion is on the de-
fendant.
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case goes to the jury which weighs the permissible inference of accident
against the evidence of suicide and reaches a conclusion without any
reference to presumptions. How to handle a case under the anti-
Thayer point of view presents a difficult problem which has given
rise to most of the diverse theories about presumptions.
Professor Morgan, who rejects the Thayer theory, believes that a
presumption should shift the burden of persuasion. Thus, in the typi-
cal case presented above Professor Morgan would say that, upon proof
of violent death, the jury should be instructed to find accident un-
less they were persuaded of the fact of suicide. This view does not re-
quire telling the jury about the presumption but it is objectionable
because it confuses the concept of burden 'of persuasion. Rules re-
garding the burden of persuasion are normally thought of as being
in the field of substantive law and as resulting from policy considera-
tions. There is extensive, and almost uniform, judicial holding to the
effect that the burden of persuasion never shifts.
It may be because of this reluctance on the part of courts to shift
the burden of persuasion that Professor Morgan's theory has received
little acceptance. Most courts which do not follow the Thayer theory
say that a presumption may be regarded as evidence. This view ne-
cessitates instructing the jury about the presumption. It is objection-
able in that it confuses the concept of evidence. Evidence is usually
thought of as consisting of propositions of fact rather than legal or
logical principles. Even Professor Morgan criticizes the view that a
presumption is evidence.
7
In the typical case of New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamers the Su-
preme Court followed the Thayer theory. It held that the presump-
tion against suicide was not evidence and that it was reversible error
to give an instruction about the presumption. The recent case of Dick
v. New York Life Ins. Co.9 involved the same problem and the same
presumption. In that case the evidence of suicide seemed to be so con-
clusive that the Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the plain-
tiff-beneficiary upon the ground that the District Court should have
directed a verdict for the defendant insurance company. In revers-
ing the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court (opinion
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren) upheld the trial court's instruction that
accidental death was presumed and that the defendant had the burden
of persuading the jury that death resulted from suicide. The Court
avoided the effect of Gamer upon the ground that subsequent to that
7ALI Model Code of Evidence, p. 311.
83o 3 US. 161 (1938)."359 U.S. 437 (1959)-
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case the decision in Erie Ry. v. Tom pkinsO required the following
of state law. The instruction approved in.Dick substantially follows
Professor Morgan's theory, although that theory would not require
telling the jury about the presumption but only about the location of
the burden of persuasion. In supporting his conclusion the Chief
Justice states that, under North Dakota law, the presumption "has
the weight of affirmative evidence." Professor Morgan would not say
that. Here the court has confused the shift the burden of persuasion
view of presumptions with the presumption as evidence theory.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Dick took the position
that its decision was necessitated by North Dakota law. Chief Justice
Warren referred to N. D. Rev. Code of 1943, section 31-1ioi and re-
lied upon four North Dakota cases. The code provision is as follows:
"A presumption, unless declared by law to be conclusive,
may be controverted by other direct or indirect evidence but
unless so controverted, the jurors are bound to find according
to the presumption."
The North Dakota statute does not, by its terms, repudiate the
Thayer theory. It is equally consistent with both Thayer and anti-
Thayer theories. The statute merely provides that, in the absence of
rebutting evidence, the presumed fact must be found. As pointed out
above, this is true under all theories. The statute does not touch upon
the real issue which is: what happens when rebutting evidence is in-
troduced?
The first of the four North Dakota decisions cited by the Supreme
Court in Dick is the most recently decided, Svihovec v. Woodmen Acc.
Co." That case was similar to Dick and involved the same presump-
tion. Although the evidence of suicide in Svihovec was no stronger
than in Dick the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that there
should have been a directed verdict for the defendant insurance com-
pany. The court did, by way of dictum, say that the presumption had
the "weight of evidence," but there is no indication that the instruc-
tion approved in Dick was even offered.
The next two cases cited by the Court in Dick are Paulsen v.
Modern Woodmen of America12 and Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of
America."3 Both of these cases involved ordinary life insurance and
not insurance against accidental death. In such cases it is well estab-
lished that the burden of persuasion as to the defense of suicide is
"304 U.S. 64 (1930).
u69 N.D. 259, 285 N.WV. 447 (1939)-
121 N.D. 235, 13o N.W. 231 (1911).
m 14 N.D. nG, io 3 N.W. 402 (1905).
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upon the defendant insurance company irrespective of any presump-
tion. 4 In fact, the concept of a presumption is of little value in
cases like these. A presumption has utility when it operates in favor
of the party upon whom the burden of persuasion is imposed. For a
presumption to operate in favor of one party when his adversary
has the burden of persuasion has been likened to "throwing a hand-
kerchief upon a man already covered by a blanket."' 5 In Paulsen
the court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff-beneficiary, whereas in
Clemens the court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant. Not-
withstanding the presumption, the evidence of suicide in Clemens was
so conclusive as to justify the peremptory instruction. In both cases
the court did say that the burden of persuasioh was on the defendant,
but, as pointed out herein, that would be true irrespective of any
presumption.
The other North Dakota case cited by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Dick is Stevens v. Continental Cas. Co.16 Like Svihovec, Stevens in-
volved suit upon a policy of insurance against accidental death. Stevens
did not, however, involve the problem of suicide but rather the cov-
erage of death resulting from injury intentionally inflicted by a third
party. Deceased was the brakeman and was killed by the discharge of
a pistol during his attempt to eject a person from the train. The
whole issue was whether the shot by the third person was intentional
(in which case there was no liability) or accidental (in which case there
would be liability). It was held that the evidence created a jury case
upon that issue. The court held that the policy was so worded that
the defendant insurance company had the burden of persuasion. Thus
it is seen that Stevens is subject to the same analysis as Paulsen and
Clemens and there is no presumption of any significance.
The following conclusions may be drawn:
(i) The authorities cited by the U. S. Supreme Court in Dick, ex-
cept for dictum in Svihovec, are entirely consistent with the Thayer
view and do not require the conclusion reached in Dick.
(2) It is not clear whether the Supreme Court is following the
shift the burden of persuasion rule (the true Morgan theory) or the
presumption as evidence view.
"See note 8, supra.
"There is a temptation to designate as spurious such a use of the term presump-
tion. A better expression might be to say that such a so-called presumption lacks
significance. The best example is the presumption of innocence in criminal cases.
Here the force of tradition hides the dearth of logic.
'ns2 N.D. 463, 97 N.W. 862 (19o3).
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